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SOUR NOTES ON THE 
THEORY OF VOTE TRADL�G 
John A. Ferejohn 
California Institute of Technology 
The recent literature on logrolling or vote trading has been 
quite long on intuitive argument and carefully constructed examples, 
and short on general theorems. This state of affairs is not too 
surprising since for all the scholarly attention the subject has recently 
enjoyed, there is remarkably little agreement on concepts or definitions. 
As a result most arguments are carried out in an ambiguous setting, 
and authors appear to arrive at quite different conclusions about the 
outcomes of vote trading in legislatures. Just to provide some 
orientation for those who have not plowed through the literature 
recently, I shall provide a brief review of the literature on the subject. 
The literature on vote trading has of course grown out of 
that on voting institutions and, more generally, out of the study of 
aggregation procedures or mechanisms of social choice (Black [ 1958], 
Arrow [1963}). In an early study Buchanan and Tullock [1962] 
introduced a distinction between explicit logrolling (in which legislators 
make agreements among themselves to exchange votes) and implicit 
logrolling (in which parties or candidates make up platforms out of 
the whole set of issues and legislators choose among them). They 
analyze explicit logrolling in their famous 11road repairing" example 
and shew that voters have an incentive to make bargains among themselves 
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so that an excessive amount of investment takes place in road repair. 
Evidently one feature of the situation Buchanan and Tullock examine 
is that under majority rule over all possible road repair packages, 
there is no 11equilibrium" social choice. That is, each platform 
(under implicit logrolling) is defeated in majority vote by some other 
platform. 
James Coleman [1966] provided a somewhat different set 
of concepts to analyze vote e'�changes. He argued that logrolling 
permits the expression of 11in.tensity11 of preference and that this possibility 
allows circumvention of Arrow1 s paradox. 'While this latter statement 
rests on a misconception, Co,leman did introduce some tools that seem 
useful for studying vote trading. In particular his model explicitly 
recognizes the dependence of voter behavior on expectations or beliefs 
about what the other legislators may do. Further, Coleman argues 
that with a sufficiently large number of issues and legislators, a vote-
trading system 11 • • •  approaches in one sense a market situation 
[1966, p. 1117]. Further 11 • • •  just as a free market with pure 
competition can be conceived in economic exchange, and used as a 
theoretical model from which actual systems can be studied, a similar 
model of pure competition c an be conceived in collective decisions. 11 
[1966, p. 1118]. As we shall subsequently see, there are rather 
" 
. severe limitations on how far one can fruitfully carry this view. 
Nevertheless, it seems useful to ask to what extent concepts from 
the theory of exchange can hEilp us explain legislative phenomena. 
Coleman's paper elicited a rather lively response and in a 
comment R. E. Park [1967] established that (where voters1 preferences 
are represented by additive utility functions) a vote-trading equilibrium 
is just what would have occu1�red without vote trading. Mueller [1967] 
emphasized the costs of forrning coalitions and policing defections 
which would prevent a vote-trading system from approximating an 
exchange economy. Mueller concluded that " . . .  when voters are 
able to make and keep vote-trading agreements, their welfare..,,.:_}_} 
be greater than if no agreements were made" [1967, p. 1310]. It 
is unclear just what concept of 11welfare11 Mueller is invoking in !-:is 
conclusion. 
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If he means that vote trading can produce Pareto impro,·ements, 
then v.:e shall see that the veracity of his remarks depends on the form of 
the voters1 preferences. In particular, if legislators have what are 
called 11separable11 preferences, Mueller's assertion is false since 
in this case a version of Park1s theore1n applies: if there is a vote­
trading equilibrium, it is identical to the 11sincere voting11 outcome 
in the case where no trade is allowed. Of course Mueller may be 
using some other notion of welfare in which case it is not possible 
to decide the question of whether vote trading can produce welfare 
gains. 
In his reply to Park1s and Mueller1s papers, Coleman [1967]
seems to realize that a "market for votes" contains some fundamental 
imperfections. In particular, he argues that even if votes are fully 
exchangeable, if legislators are permitted to learn what trades 
actually take place among others, there may fail to be a price 
equilibrium. He also insists that as long as the legislators' subjective 
beliefs about what trades are occurring elsewhere do not change "too 
much11 that there will be an equilibrium in the trading process. 
In a recent contribution Tullock (1970] argued that explicit 
logrolling is 11stable" and leads to an expected increase in welfare 
of the members of the legislature. It seems that unless he has hidden 
some strong assumptions about what coalitions are permitted to form, 
or is using a curious concept of stability, that explicit lo'grolling is not 
generally stable. I belieYe that the most natural stability concepts in 
this case are these: 
l .  
z. 
Each legislator hc.s a vote intention for each bill such 
that it would not p:-ofit any of them to change their vote 
intention on any issue. 
Each legislature has a vote intention on each bill and no 
majority has the incentive to collectively change its vote 
intentions. 
By either of these tests, Tullock1s example is not stable, Perhaps 
he is employing a somewhat different concept which is unapparent 
to me. 
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Along a somewhat different line, Wilson [1969) produced a 
market model for vote trading and gives a set of axioms that limit 
the set of '1admissible11 decis:Lon rules that legislators may adopt in 
choosing among alternative packages of votes on issues. Among his 
results is a theorem that states that the legislators will buy votes on 
issues in proportion to the 1Utility gain11 they experience in the issue. 
In particular it will not happen that if I care most about issue one 
and much less about issues tl;<:o, three, four, etc. (though I still care) 
that I will spend all my votes on issues two through n to procure votes 
on issue one. Generally speaking I will hold votes on issues of less 
importance to me under Wilson's assumptions. Wilson1s model is 
peculiar in that the decision rule chosen seems not to depend explicitly 
on the expected behavior of the other legislators. 
A recent set of papers by K�dane [1972], Bernholz [1973, 1974] 
and Koehler [1973) seem to follow much more closely in the tradition 
of work inaugurated by Park. In particular, using B�chanan and 
Tullock1s concepts these authors demonstrate that under certain 
conditions, if implicit logrolling has a stable platform then the set 
of issues passed in explicit logrolling is the same platform. Secondly 
if such a stable platform exists it is characterized as the set of bills that 
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would pass if everyone voted their true preferences one issue at a 
time. Thirdly, if the implicit logrolling process has no stable platform 
then neither does the explicit process. 
After reviewing the relevant literature I am struck by a series 
of disagreements among the various authors. First, those who have 
dealt with vote trading seem neatly divided on the question of prevalence. 
Buchanan and Tullock, and Haefele [1971] seem to believe that much 
vote trading occurs in legislative institutions. Buchanan and Tullock 
remark that there are 11 • • •  certain relatively rare institutional 
situations in which logrolling will not be likely to occur. H [1962, 
p. 132]. Riker and Brams [1973] and Kramer [1972] on the other hand 
appear to believe that actual vote trading is not a frequent occurrence 
in most legislatures. 
A second division one finds in the literature concerns the 
degree to which vote trading in a legislature approximates an exchange 
economy. Coleman [1966] suggests that the approximation is close. 
Riker and Brams. and Haefele caution against making too much of the 
apparent similarities. Riker and Brams remark: 
In general . • •  the market for legislative votes is quite 
different from the market for private goods and it is not 
wise to draw analogies from one market to the other. 
(1973, p. 1236] 
Third, there is the traditional question of the 11social benefit11 
of permitting logrolling. Haefele, Buchanan and Tullock, Coleman, 
and others argue that the introduction of vote trading can increase the 
"welfare" of legislatures. But Riker and Brams dispute this claim by 
demonstrating that logrolling may make everyone worse off than they 
would have been without it. 
Finally, it seems to me that the most fundamental division in 
the literature lies between those who believe that vote trading ought to be 
modeled as a cooperative game and those who choose to model it as a 
noncooperative process. Coleman, in his reply to Park and :Mueller 
is quite explicit on this point: "If a number of persons communicate, 
this upsets the equilibrium of vote prices. Thus any description of 
the perfect system of vote exchanges . . •  is valid only in the case 
where individuals act wholly individualistically.11 [1967, p. 1316] 
Also Coleman1s model is characterized by the fact that legislators 
make probability judgments about each other, in effect, treating 
each other1s behavior as independent of one1s own. Wilson's model 
is basically noncooperative as is Mueller's, 
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On the other hand, the recent work of Kadane, Bergholz, and 
others as well as the contributions by Buchanan and Tullock contain 
cooperative analyses. That is, legislators are assurried to communicate 
and form coalitions. In between these two approaches are those by
Riker and Brams, Haefele, and to some extent Coleman, that might 
be called partially cooperative. That is, certain types of coalitions 
may form while others may not. 
It appears that Kadane and others have pretty well described 
the situation if the cooperativ4� assumptions are approximated in a 
legislature. I am skeptical enough about the possibilities of coalition 
formation in legislatures that I prefer to examine the effects of 
restrictions on coalition formation and so the models in this paper 
are of the noncooperative and partially cooperative sorts. 
In this paper 1 want to explore the ways logrolling can 
actually lead to results that are unrelated to the presence or absence 
of a majority winner. I argue that the modifications that are intro­
duced into the 11cooperative11 inodels of Kadane, Koehler, and others 
are departures in the direction of realistic descriptions and therefore 
that the deternrinate arbitrariness I obtain may occur with some 
regularity in legislative bodies. To the extent that this is true, log­
rolling may be employed by sldlled (or otherwise privileged) legislators 
to secure distributive (as opposed to welfare) gains. 
I shall proceed by setting up a simple model of a legislature 
and consider the various arguments within its confines. There is a 
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set of legislators N = fl, 2, . . •  , n} and a finite set of binary issues, 
M = fl, 2, • . •  , m}. The set of social states is represented by the 
cartesian product fO, 1 }rn. Each legislator has a binary preference 
relation R. which is a weak order. Bills are assumed to come 
' 
up for votes in a fixed order known in advance, Each legislator 
is endowed with a single vote on each issue and decisions are made by 
simple majority rule one issue at a time, 
I. \rOTE TRADING AND EQUILIBRIA 
In spite of the substantial literature on the subject, little 
attention has been given to actual trading processes. Those theorists 
who argue that legislative vote trading approximates an exchange 
economy postulate conditions which, presumably, would determine 
prices for votes, and trading is assumed to take place at the equilibrium 
prices. In this section a wholly different approach is taken. A trade 
may take place only if it improves the welfare of the traders and there 
is no reference to equilibrium exchange ratios. Such trading procedures 
are sometimes called 11nontitonnementn processes in economics. The 
appeal of such a model in legislative circumstances is, of course, that 
we need not posit the existence and operation of a set of markets (that 
have not been observed) in order to analyze vote-trading phenomena. 
Perhaps the simplest model is one where each actor knows 
everyone's preferences and all the trades that have occurred. Each 
is assumed to vote as he has agreed. In this case he knows that if the 
votes are taken at the current time, exactly which social state x E tO, l}m 
will be chosen. We require that two traders (say Mr. 1 and Mr. 2) 
will exchange votes only if, given that no one else makes any trades, 
the two actors can change the resulting social state from x to y and 
yP1x and yP2x. Let's also require that all trades be between pairs of 
actors. This trading procedure is essentially the same as that given 
by Riker and Brams and Haefele. 
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In the first part of this section I make an additional assumption 
on the form of the individual preference orderings. 
Definition. A preference ordering R on the set of social states [O, 1 }m 
is called separable if for any Q '� M and xi = y i Vi E Q and xRy 
then if X. 
' 
XR.f. 
Y; Vi E Q and X. J 
x. and 'j. = y. Vj E M - Q then 
J J J 
The idea of. this definition is that the legislator's preference on any 
subset of bills can be unambiguously determined and does not depend 
on which bills have already passed. This assumption is found throughout 
the literature on vote trading in various guises, In particular, separa­
bility is necessarily satisfied if legislators have additive utility functions 
on the bills. If preferences sati.sfy separability, we can naturally 
define vote intentions as follows. 
Definition. Si = { S11, 
his vote on issue j. 
• , Sin_) is a vector indicating how Mr. i casts 
s ·- { 1 ij ·- -1 
Given the vote intentions of each legislator S
i, one can now 
determine which social state would be chosen if no aggrements are 
made. We say that given s1 • • • •  , S • x E {O, l}m is chosen if 
n ---
and only if 
x = j 
l if LS . . > 0 
i lJ 
0 otherwise 
For clarity we may sometimes write x(S
1
,s2� , • •  , Sn). Now, two 
legislators may find it desirable to make an exchange. We now formalize 
what the set of feasible trades looks like for any pair of legislators. 
Definition. If x(S , . . .  , S ) is chosen, then we 
l n _ _  
z E A .. (x)<:=>3: vote intentions S., S. such that 
z 
lJ l J 
z(S., . . .  , S., . . .  , S., ' ' J 
• Sn). 
say that 
That is A .. (x) is the set of social states that voters i and j 
'l 
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could cause to be chosen by simply makin� an agreement to alter only 
their own vote strategies from what they were when x was chosen 
and assuming that everyone else will cast S
k 
Vk I- i, j. In a sense 
A .. (x) characterized the power of the coalition of i and j. Evidently 
>J 
if on the balloting that produced x, all issues were decided by more 
than two votes, then A .. (x) = x for all i, j. 
>J 
Definition. 3: a feasible trade between i and j at x if and only if 
3z E A .. (x) and zP.x and zP.x. 
lJ 1 J 
Definition. x E (0, l}
m is an equilibrium with respect to pairwise 
trades if and only if Vi, j E N 
zP.x and zP .x. 
' J 
1Iz EA .. (x), with the property that 
'l 
This notion of equilibrium is intended to capture the notion 
that x(S
1
, , , , , Sn) is stable if and only if if any pair of voters has 
the power to change the social state from x to z, they do not both 
desire to do so. In a sense, a state is in equilibrium if all mutual 
gains from trade have been exhausted. 
From the point of view of what Buchanan and Tullock call 
implicit logrolling, a new binary relation is introduced. The inter -
pretation of this relation is as follows. xDy if and only if x defeats y 
in a simple majority vote. Notice that in defining this rrmajority 
dominance" relation, voting is not on an issue-by-issue basis as before. 
Rather x is pitted against y in a direct contest. 
Definition. 
Definition. 
Let D be a binairy relation on [O,l}m defined as follows 
xDv <=::;> n(xP.y) > n(yP.x). , ' ' 
0 , . . . x is a ma1or1tY_W1nner <==:> Vy E (O,l}
m 0x Dy. 
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Several authors ( BE:rnholz, Koehler, and Kadane have argued 
that if there is an !!incentive to logroll11 then there is no majority winner 
and conversely. The first theorem we present demonstrates that if by 
an 11incentive to logroll 11 we mean that only Riker-Brarns or Haefele 
type trades can take place, then the converse is false. 
Theorem 1. There exists a legislature with no majority winner and 
in which there is an equilibrium with respect to pairwise trading. 
Proof. Assume there are tv;ro binary issues and five voters with the 
following separable preferences. 
1,2 ' -· 4 5 
(1, 0) (O, l) (I, I) (I, I) 
(O, 0) (O, 0) (1, 0) (0, l) 
(1, 1) (I, I) (O, 1) (1,  0) 
(0, 1) (1, 0) (0, 0) (0, O) 
One can check that there is no majority winner. 
If the voting is done one issue at a time and each legislator 
votes sincerely, we have that position 1 beats position 0 on issue one 
via the group {l, 2,4, 5} and that position 1 beats position 0 on issue 
two via the group {3,4,5}. 
Given that the status quo is {l, 1) there is no feasible trade 
between a pair of legislators. 
to p:iirWise trading. 
Thus ( l ,  l) is an equilibrium with respect 
Q.E.D. 
II 
This simple result indicates th.a.;; if trades are for some reason
difficult to organize, vote-trading processes may have equilibria even 
though the underlying majority dominance relation is cyclic. Of course 
the basic phenomenon here is that no one member can by changing his 
vote change the outcome on issue one from what it would have been under 
is sue-by-issue sincere voting. 
One need not look far to find legislative situations which bear 
some similarity to that characterized in the proof of theorem one. 
For example, a legislature considering a number of pork-barrel projects, 
each contained in the district of a single member, would have vote-trading 
equilibria in this sense with no projects constructed even though the 
majority dominance relation is cyclic. 
It is possible to establish a somewhat more surprising theorem. 
Assuming only pairwise trading is allowed, the majority dominance 
relation on {O, l }m may have a majority v.·inner and yet, from a given 
status quo, pair'-\'ise trading may not lead to it. Some care must be 
taken in choosing the status quo in a natural way. We simply let the 
status quo be the position chosen in issue-by-issue sincere voting, 
beginning with the state (0, O). Given this definition we say that a social 
m
state x E { 0, 1} is unreachable in pairwise trades if and only if starting 
at the status quo there is no sequence of feasible trades leading to x. 
Theorem 2. Assuming legislators hold weak orders there is a legislature 
with a majority winner that is unreachable in pairwise trades. 
Proof. Consider a legislature in which all the legislators hold the 
following preferences (which violates separability)e 
II 
00 
01 
10 
12 
Then 11 is the majority winner and in pairwise contests 00 beats 01 and 10. 
Ii we interpret 00 as the status quo clearly no pairwise trades are possible
if n is at least 5. Q. E. D. 
It is already well known. [Kadane, 1972] that if the legislator's 
preferences are separable then if x E {O, l }
m 
is the majority winner, 
it is simply the vector of majority winners in issue-by-issue voting. 
This is simply our notion of the status quo and so in this case the majority 
winner is trivially reachable in pairwise trades. 
Theorems one and two indicate that once restrictions are placed 
on the way in which trading can occur, vote trading may produce results 
that are largely independent of the principle of majority rule. Permitting 
only pairwise trading may create equilibria where none existed previously 
or fail to reach equilibria which do exist. Of course similar theorems can 
be proved when somewhat larger trades may be organized though if the 
trades are permitted to become 11large enough11 the vote-trading process 
will begin to bear a 11nice11 relation to majority rule. In particular if 
any size trade is feasible under the condition that the welfare of all 
traders is improved, and if preferences are separable, then we have the 
Kadane-Park-Bergholz situation.. Ii there is a majority winner, it is 
trivially reachable. If there is :no majority wiilner the trading process 
has no equilibria. 
I would argue that thesE� two theorems, simple as they are, 
may be quite relevant to ·the operation of legislatures. The argument 
is of course that restrictions on the size of feasible trades arise in very 
natui;-al ways in legislative institutions. In the absence of fungible votes
the bookkeeping involved in large trades is likely to be difficult. Secondly, 
the possibility of trades induces members to be deceitful about how they 
would cast their untraded vote. It seems to me the larger the trade the 
more difficult it is for traders to police this sort of thing. These 
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observations would seem to be behind the stringent Riker-Brarns 
pairwise trading requirements. To the extent that they are descriptive 
of legislative situations, one must expect that observed equilibria 
will bear little relation to the majority winner if one exists. 
One may reasonably ask \<:hether or not reachable equilibria 
of the pairwise trading process always exist. We give an example to 
show that no general existence theorem is possible, 
Theorem 3. There exist legislatures where members have separable 
preferences which have no reachable equilibria in pairwise trading. 
�· Consider a legislature of five members with the following 
configuration of preferences: 
Member 1 
11 
01 
10 
00 
2 
00 
01 
10 
11 
3 
01 
00 
11 
10 
4 
10 
00 
11 
01 
5 
11 
10 
01 
00 
s 1
ij (1,1) (-1,-1) (-1,1) (1,-1) (1,1) 
Evidently if everyone votes sincerely x1 = {1,1). 
A34(x
1) = {(1, 1), (1,0), (0,1), (0, 0)} and we find that there is an 
2 2 1 2 1  2 1x = (0,0) such that x E A
34(x ) and x 
P3x , and x P4
x
2 
s . . 
'J 
( 1, 1) (-1, -1) (-1, -1) (-1, -1) 
2 Al 3(x ) 
= ((0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)] 
and 
5
3
.
'J 
3 2 . 3 2 3 2x = (0, l )  E A
13(x ) 
with x P
1
x , x P3x
( 1, 1) ( - 1 , -1) (-1, 1) (-1, -1) 
(1, 1) 
(1, 1) 
3 A14(x ) = ((0, 1), (0,0), (1,1), (1,0)
} 
4 3 4 3 4 3 3x = (1,1) E A14(x ), x P1x ,  x P4x
and 
4 1 x = x and s:. 
'l 
s�.
'J
2 
Note that when x was the status quo 
2 A
45(x ) = ((1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1), (0, 0)) 
,..3 2 .... 3 2 ,..3 2 x = (l,O) E A45(x ) and x P4x ,  x P5x
•3 
s , (1, 1) (-1,-1) (-1, -1) 
A35(
;t3) = ((1,0), (1,1), (O,O), (0,1)}
\\c4 ,.3 ,...4 1 (1, l )  E A35(x ) and Sij 
= Sij 
(1, -1) 
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(1, 1) 
This establishes that there is n.o reachable equilibrium in this situation 
since for any reachable social situation a feasible pairwise trade exists. 
Q. E.D. 
Theorem three establishes that a pairwise trading process 
will sometimes fail to reach an equilibrium. The problem seems to 
be that if given the status quo any pairwise trade takes place, certain 
issues will be decided by only one vote. This feature of the Riker-Brarns 
rules allows some legislators the power to alter the social state by 
changing their voting strategies, All that is required for instability 
is that some pair of legislatorB with this power be able to agree to 
change the social state to something both V.'ould prefer. In the Riker-Brams
trading procedure, there is no concern on the part of legislators to 
provide for a "margin of victo:r"y. 11 
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II. INFORl\.1.A T!ON, :NfO�EY, AND VOTE TRADI�G 
be 
T·o the extent that only small trades are possible, ne'\\' equilibria 
introduced which are dependent on the historical process by -...-1:hich 
issues arise. Certain other possibilities would seem to permit potential 
equilibria to be destroyed. Assume, for example, that each legislator 
holds an initial quantity- of money which he is free to exchange for votes 
as he pleases. Without going into too much analysis, one can see that a 
pairwise trade need only make one member better off to be feasible since 
compensation in money is possible, For example, in the preference 
distribution given in the proof of theorem 1, Mr. 1 might be willing 
to pay up to $10 for the outcome to change from (1, 1) to (1. 0), while 
Mr. 3 might willingly accept any amount over $2 to vote for 0 over 1 
on issue two. In such a case, allowing pairwise trading with money, we 
would not have (1, 1) as an equilibrium. 
may 
Of course, in this example, Mr . 3 was pivotal on issue two and so 
if he switched his vote and everyone else voted the same as before the 
trade, the outcome would be different. Without much difficulty one can 
imagine situations in which each issue won by more than two votes and 
there is no majority winner. In such cases the introduction of money 
by itself, will not upset pair\vise trading equilibria. Consider what 
would happen if Mr. 3 was willing to pay up to $10 for the defeat of 
issue one, while Mr. l and Mr. 2 would each gladly accept $2 to change 
their votes. If there is a restriction to pairwise trades, Mr. 3 v.· ould 
not trade v.•ith either Mr . 1 or Mr. 2 since neither is pivotal. In this 
case even with the availability of money (l, l) may still be a pairwise 
equilibrium. 
A little reflection should convince the reader that the problem 
in this last example is the requirement that a legislator be unwilling to 
trade 'unless he is made 11better off11 than before as a result of his trade. 
If we amend this restriction to the more modest requirement that he must 
expect to be better off, a v.·hole new set of trading possibilities arise. 
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In the last example, if ��r. B 1!expects11 to be able to obtain votes fror:n 
both },.fr, 1 and Mr. 2 o::', issue one, he would be \Villing to engage in 
an initial pairwise trade v.rith one of them. Olle can see that depending 
on what expectations legislators have about trading possibilities, the 
pairwise trade restrictio:-i. :rnay not circumscribe outcomes in the manner 
of theorems one and t<;<;·o at all. Of course, this possibility must depend 
on the expectations held by the legislators, and so one cannot hope for 
general results �long these lines unless more structure is put on the 
way legislators gather information about each others1 preferences 
and about which trades have taken place. 
In our discussion of trading processes we have so far assumed 
that when a trader decides to trade he looks only at his own current and 
future trading possibilities (as best he can}. Of course a legislator 
will generally be aware that his own welfare depends on what future 
trades the other legislators undertake. If he surrenders his vote 
on some issue to one of his peers, it may be traded to others with 
consequences far different from those that would have arisen from the 
initial trade. Apparently. this situation would be quite difficult to model 
and as a result a number of questions about it remain unanswered. In 
particular cari we expect any relationship between the majority domination 
relation and some sort of stability concept in a trading model of this 
complexity? 
Theorems 1 and Z indicate that we cannot expect any general 
relationship between these concepts since the model therein contains 
expectations that are admissible in the present discussion. Nevertheless 
it is -perhaps not too much to hope that appropriate restrictions on 
how expectations are formed and modified could lead to some positive 
results. It seems to me th.at the complications mentioned here are 
very much pre�ent in actual vote-trading situations, and So unless 
attempts are made to com€� to grips with actual trading processes, 
we will be unable to address ourselves to the issues raised by vote 
trading which are mentioned in the introduction. 
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Before proceeding with a discussion of market institutions which 
may serve to reduce the complexity of belief formation, it seems appropriate 
to venture a few remarks on a model of a legislature which is based on a 
somewhat more extreme restriction on trading possibilities than that 
considered here. In a recent publication Kramer [1972] argued that policing 
of contracts in a legislature is likely to be so expensive that a noncooperative 
analysis of legislative voting is likely to produce more realistic results 
than a model based on cooperative game theory. He demonstrated that 
if no trades are possible, but if legislators are permitted to vote in a 
11sophisiticated11 manner, under assumptions on preferences given 
in this paper, there always exists an equilibrium in the NASH sense,
That is, each player has a sophisticated voting strategy which, assuming 
that no one else will change his strategy, he does not find it advantageous 
to depart from. Kramer does not ask whether this equilibrium bears 
any relation to a majority winner if one exists, but using tools that 
are employed in the study of logrolling, we may easily give an answer 
to this question. 
Kramer gives a necessary condition that x be the sophisticated voting 
outcome (which is unique if preferences are strict). It is that if x' differs 
from x in only one issue, then it is not true that x' defeats x in majority 
vote. Let y be the outcome obtained by sincere voting majority vote 
issue by issue {we can ensure this is unique by assuming that preferences 
are strict and that there are an odd number of voters). Then by Kadane1s [1972] 
improvement algorithm, we know that if x is any other outcome {in particular 
the sophisticated voting outcome) there is a sequence of outcomes 
l 2 m i i+ l . , x = y , y , • • •  , y = y such that y and y d1ffer in one issue and 
i+ l . such that y defeats y1 in majority vote. U there is a majority winner,
it is y and so the sophisticated voting outcome must be y. In fact, we
have established a bit more than this: 
1 8  
Theorem 4. If voters have strict, separable preference orders, then 
the unique sophisiticated voting equilibrium is the outcome that results 
from sincere voting issue by issue. 
Thus we have the nonintuitive result that as long as preferences are 
strict and separable, and issues are voted on one at a time, and no 
trading is feasible among (the odd number of) legislators, the unique 
equilibrium is where the n1embers vote sincerely. 
III. MARKETS FOR VOT:E:S 
Several theorists have approached vote-trading phenomena in 
a different manner from that discussed above, Rather than consider 
hontlltonnement trading procedures, Coleman, Wilson, and others have 
investigated what might happen if there were equilibrium prices for 
votes and if all trade took place at such prices. If the legislature is 
large enough one might thir1k that the presence of such markets would 
alleviate the need for members to form elaborate expectations about 
what their peers desire and how they might behave. Instead the legislator 
is assumed to take prices as fiXed independently. of the quantity of votes 
he demands and to maximize his well -being subject to a budget constraint. 
While the idea of .a competitive market for votes is attractive 
on several grounds, it turns out that when an analysis of the implications 
of such an institution is made, some disturbing problems arise. In this 
section I introduce a market for votes and attempt to define individual 
m�mizing behavior and equilibrium prices. The model given here 
differs from others found in the literature, but it appea·rs to me that
most of the problems that arise for this model are ones that really 
would occur in a market fc,r votes. 
The idea of a vote: market is that when faced with a particular 
set of prices the legislator decides on what package of votes he wants 
to cast-on the issues facing the voting body. That is, he formulates
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a "demand function11 for votes on each issue which depends on the prices 
he faces. The easiest way to see the difficulty with such a formulation 
is to consider the problem of a legislator who faces a price ratio of 
two be�·een issues A and B. For each vote on A he can get two votes 
on B. Hov.· can he decide whether to make an exchange? On a little 
reflection it seems clear that his willingness to deal at this price depends 
on what he thinks the outcome of the post-trade voting will be for each 
imaginable trade. He will pay more for a pivotal vote than one not so 
fortuitously placed, In other words our formulation will have to reflect 
the fact that each legislator1 s choice is dependent on what he thinks the 
others v.·ill do. This dependence is what makes a vote market peculiar. 
The following definitions characterize this situation, 
Definition, Let V • .  denote the number of votes on the f£ issue held by 
'J 
voter i. 
th Definition. Let S . . = + l or -1 depending on whether the i- voter is for 
'J 
or against passage of the Jh bill {separability and strict preferences 
ensures this can be defined). 
Definition. For any distribution of votes (V .. ) the corresponding social 
'J 
state x is defined as 
x. 
J t <:=::> LS .. V .. > 0 i lJ lJ otherwise Vj . 
Legislators are assumed to maximize their welfare at given 
prices p = (p.), where p. > O and Lp . = 1. 
J J j J 
In this situation the notion of maximality is a little ambiguous. 
After all if you decide to sell a vote on issue j that you would have cast 
in f�vo=: of the issue's passage , how do you assume it is cast by its 
new owner? Likewise if you purchase a vote on an issue, should you 
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assume that this affects your expectation of the vote holdings? In this 
model I will make the assumption that the legislator purchases and sells 
only to his adversaries on .an issue so that he can in a natural manner 
adjust his expectation as to the post-trade outcome of the balloting. 
This assumption of course violates the usual anonymity properties of 
markets and in doing so imp:licitly overlooks the possibilities of 
deceitfulness in announcing voting intentions, However I do not think 
it too unnatural as a description of vote-trading possibilities, 
Definition: Vie say that Vi is maximal with respect to 
p,VI, · · • • vi-l'vi+l • · • • vn•51• • • • • 5i-1'51+1' · • • • 5n 
for the ith voter if and only if for any other strategy W., let ' 
and 
., { 
Z . . � V .. + 2(W . . • V .. ) lJ lJ l..J lJ 
<.:;=:> 81jvtj+ • • • + si-ljvi-lj+ 5ijzij+ 5i+Ij vi+Ij 
otherwise 
+ • • •  + s .v . > 0 UJ OJ 
and yP1x, then Ep.W .. > 
1. 
j J lJ 
That is, V. is maximal ' 
for legislator i if and only if at the given prices p he cannot change his 
vote _holdings unilaterally in such a manner that the resulting social 
states leaves him better off v•ithout violating his budget constraint. 
Note that if the legislator trades away a vote on issue j for a quantity 
on iss.ue k, a two-vote switch is supposed to occur on each issue. 
Definition: (p, (V .. )] is a cOmpetitive equilibrium � V. is maximal 
•J --- ' 
for each i given p and Vi 
EV .. = n Vj 
i 1J 
Vj 
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Note that each member1s choice V. depends not only on price but also
' 
on his expectations of what votes his peers hold and how they will cast 
them. Technically therefore we should parameterize a competitive 
equilibrium on this information. Also. it seems worth remarking that 
competitive equilibria may exist even 'vhen expectations are inconsistent 
with it. This possibility seems somewhat bizarre, and a more satisfactory 
model of vote markets might contain some sort of adjustment mechanism 
for expectations that would serve to bring them into line with one another 
at equilibrium, 
Evidently, this formulation differs from the classic exchange 
economy in several ways. Fi rst of all the demand functions for votes 
depend not only on prices but on what the other legislators hold and how 
they will cast their holdings. The common sense of this is quite obviouso 
You would be willing to pay quite different amounts for a vote depending 
on whether that vote was or was not pivotal on an issue. Now what this 
means of course is that, unlike the case of a classical exchange economy, 
no great reduction in informational requirements is achieved in a legislature 
by introducing markets for votes. The legislators still have to form 
beliefs about what trades will be made and about the preferences of their 
peers in order to make their own decisions. 
As it turns out we may demonstrate that, in general, competitive 
equilibria do not exist in this very simple formulation. 
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Theorem 5 .  There are expectations and preference distributions such 
that no competitive equilibriun1 exists. 
Proof. Assume that three legislators have.additive utility functions on 
two issues represented as follows. 
2 3 
II 00 10 
01 01 l l  
10 10 00 
00 ll 01 
Utilities for 
each issue: (4,5) (4,3) (2,l) 
sij:
(1,1) (-1·,-1) ( l, -1) 
We need only consider the price ratio between issue two 
Pz and is sue one -
so we will look at the individual demand functions for all ratios 
between 0 and°"• We assume that legislators one and two believe that 
t_he others will vote sincerely issue by issue while Mr. three expects 
that Mr. one will vote (-1, l) and Mr. two will vote (-1, -1). We may
now consider three cases. 
Case 1 . ----
Pz l 
0 < - < -- P1 2 
(_,
1
_ €))
di(::) = �:.!__ e) 
Pz 2 
d
2(::) = ( : )
d3(::) = ( : )
where e is such that 
P 1 l p (Z-e)>l 
2 
P1 
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Note that both Mr. two and :t-..1r. three would like to purchase t + 6 votes 
on issue one but at the prices in this interval they would have to give up 
more than the one vote they have on issue two. Therefore the market 
will not clear since there is excess demand at any prices in this range. 
Case 2. 
I Pz - < - < 
2 - P1 
d
i ( :: ) = ( �: x)
.. Pz 
dzG:) = ( _;�y)
d
3(:�) = (_:I z
)
Pz 
2 
Market clearing implies that 
and 
y + z < x 
P1 -x 
Pz 
P1 
< -(y + z) - Pz 
where 
P1 I -x>-
Pz 
2 
I 
where y > 2 and 
where 
I z > z and 
P1 -y < 
Pz 
p
l -z < 
Pz 
or, x = y + z. 
I IBut y > z• z > 2 ==> x > 1 so that Mr. one would be
forced to give up more votes than he has on issue one. Thus there cannot 
be an equilibrium in this range. 
p 
Case 3..:_ ...1. > 2 
P1 
d]G:) = (:) 
d
2G:) =( :� Y) I where y > 2 
d
3G:) ·(_p: z) I where z > 2 
Pz 
and 
and 
P1 I -y < -
Pz 
2 
P1 I -z < -
Pz 
2 
24 
Note that there is excess demand for votes on issue one and so there 
is no equilibrium in this interval as well. 
Q, E,D, 
What happens in the proof is, of course, at any set of prices, 
there is always someone in the market willing to trade who cannot 
find anyone to trade with. No investigation has yet been made of this 
phenomenon and so it is difficult to say how ubiquitoi.is it is. It may 
be worth mentioning that the particular preferences given in the proof 
pr6duce a cyClic majority dominance relation, and hence no majority 
winner. 
Much more work reinains to be done on the subject of the 
consistency of a competitive analysis of vote trading before firmer 
conclusions may be drawn. l''or now I am satisfied to undermine the 
facile assumption sometimes made that trading for votes may take 
place at equilibrium prices. This problem of course must encourage 
a return to the nontatonnement methods of sections I and II of this 
paper if We are to obtain ansiwers to the queries advanced in the intro­
duction. Secondly, one must notice that unlike the case of economics, 
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no informational advantages appear to be held by the market mechanism 
over actual trading procedures. In both cases each actor is required 
to formulate beliefs about what their peers desire and what they will 
do in order to formulate his optimal strategies. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
The message of this paper is that we really know very little 
theoretically about vote trading. \\.�e cannot be sure about when it will 
occur, or how often, or what sorts of bargains will be made. We don't 
know if it has any desirable normative or efficiency properties. In 
short, we are incapable at present of providing much of a resolution 
to the divisions among scholars of the subject. A few observations 
Seem worth making nevertheless. 
First of all, in the case· of trading procedures, it is apparent 
that if the legislature is modeled as a cooperative game in -..vhich any 
coalition may organize a trade, the social choice process will end up 
bearing a close relation to the majority domination relation. To the 
extent that we impose limits (whether institutional, normative, or 
behavioral} on cooperative behavior, this relation will become attenuated. 
At the extreme of a completely noncooperative analysis, Krarr�er's 
paper indicates that whether or not the majority dominance relation has 
a majority winner, there is always a noncooperative equilibrium. That 
is, some definite social choice will be produced no matter what the distri­
bution of preferences. Of course one may not �xpect to find very strong 
normative justitication for the social choice in this case, but in the 
absence of a majority winner, one might argue that this equilibrium is 
as good as any other. At least Kramer's procedure produces the 
majority winner if there is one, and this seems to be a desirable property. 
The meage!" results we have on pairwise trading indicate that 
if the legislature is not too small, then equilibria of· such processes are 
like�y t_o bear little relation to the majority dominance relation. Of 
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course we do not have an existence theorem comparable to Krarner1s 
in this case so that we cannot claim that such procedures are generally 
determinate. However, if preferences are separable, if there is a 
majority winner, then it will be an equilibrium. It would appear that 
any restriction on coalition formation would be open to the sort of 
investigation we are discussing here. As of now, existence theorems 
are yet to be proved, and Theorem 3 must make us despair of finding 
any very general results along these lines. 
Turning now to the analysis of markets for votes, several 
points suggest themselves. In economic life, markets are organized 
because some people stand to gain something through their operation, 
As far as I have been able tei determine� such markets probably are 
not organized in legislatures for the complementary reason. Nothing 
is gained by anyone through their operation that could not be gained 
through a direct exchange. The very real indeterminancy of rational 
behavior in the presence.of a price system is a reflection of the inter­
dependency that a voting process imposes on the valuation of votes as 
commodities. These indeterrninancies are in no way reduced by intro­
ducing a price system. Of course the fact that a price system fails 
to accomplish trading efficiencies in this case is compounded by the 
fact that equilibrium prices :may fail to exi�t. 
Even if these difficulties are ignored, it is not known, when 
competitive equilibria do exist, -..vhat properties they have. Since such 
equilibria will generally dep·end on expectations, it would be surprising 
if any general results are to be found. In any event no one seems to 
have produced any rigorous analysis along these lines. 
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